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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
We are asked to determine whether referencing a 
criminal defendant’s need for drug rehabilitation is appropriate 
when imposing a prison sentence following the revocation of 
supervised release.  Appellant is Janet Sonja Schonewolf, a 
repeat offender struggling with heroin dependency.  Following 
her most recent arrest, the District Court revoked Schonewolf’s 
supervised release and sentenced her to 40 months’ 
imprisonment, an upward variance over the Sentencing 
Guidelines range.  Schonewolf claims that the District Court 
imposed this sentence based on her need for drug 
rehabilitation, in violation of the Sentencing Reform Act (the 
“Act”)1 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tapia v. United 
States.2  We disagree, and hold that her sentence did not violate 
the Act and Tapia.  We will therefore affirm.     
  
I. Factual Background 
 
The facts of this case have become far too common.  
Schonewolf has spent much of her life in the throes of 
addiction.  Both of her parents were addicts, foreshadowing her 
own life.  Her father was a methamphetamine user who 
encouraged her to sell diet pills in school on his behalf.  Her 
mother was a food addict who weighed over 500 pounds at the 
time of her death.  At age 14 Schonewolf began smoking 
marijuana, and by age 15 she left her home and dropped out of 
high school.  Shortly thereafter, Schonewolf developed a 
drinking problem and attempted suicide several times before 
being diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  Schonewolf also 
                                                          
1 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. 
2 564 U.S. 319 (2011). 
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admits having used crack cocaine and methamphetamines 
when she was younger.  
 
Schonewolf’s use of opiates began with the use of 
prescription painkillers.  Specifically, she was prescribed 
Percocet for pain stemming from back injuries sustained in a 
car accident, followed by a fentanyl patch.  Schonewolf 
became addicted to opiates and, following her doctor’s 
retirement, began using heroin to satisfy her addiction.   
A. Schonewolf’s Prior Offense 
 
Predictably, all of this led to trouble with the law.  In 
2010, Schonewolf was pulled over in Utah and admitted to 
having approximately twelve pounds of methamphetamine in 
the trunk of her car.  Evidently, her father had given her 
$88,000 and requested she buy drugs in Nevada and bring them 
to him in Pennsylvania.  Ultimately, Schonewolf pled guilty to 
one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute.  The District Court granted a downward variance 
from the Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced Schonewolf to 
time served, followed by 60 months’ supervised release. 
 
B. Schonewolf’s Instant Offense 
 
After several years of progress on supervised release, 
Schonewolf suffered a relapse.3  She began using heroin again 
                                                          
3 Relapse is a common occurrence in the process of drug 
addiction recovery, leading some to argue it is best understood 
as a chronic illness, which may require continuing care 
throughout the sufferer’s life.  See A. Thomas McLellan et al., 
Drug Dependence, a Chronic Mental Illness: Implications for 
Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 JAMA 
1689 (2000). 
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and was caught attempting to purchase the drug.  This resulted 
in two Pennsylvania misdemeanor charges.  Additionally, 
these charges violated the terms of Schonewolf’s supervised 
release. 
 
Schonewolf’s probation officer filed a Violation of 
Supervised Release petition in the District Court.  One month 
later, however, the officer withdrew the petition, noting that 
Schonewolf was involved in a detox program.  Unfortunately, 
Schonewolf suffered an overdose and left treatment.  As a 
result, her probation officer refiled the petition and the District 
Court convened a revocation hearing.  At that hearing, the 
Government indicated that Schonewolf was again in treatment 
and making progress, so the District Court adjourned for a 
month.  When the District Court reconvened, it sentenced 
Schonewolf to one day in prison, followed by her pre-existing 
term of supervised release. 
 
In October 2016, Schonewolf was found to be selling 
heroin out of her house.  She admitted to have been doing so 
for six to seven months.  Schonewolf pled guilty to several drug 
charges and was sentenced to two to four years’ imprisonment 
by the state court.  She is currently serving that sentence.  
Based on this conduct, Schonewolf’s probation officer also 
filed a new Violation of Supervised Release. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
The District Court convened a revocation hearing under 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) regarding Schonewolf’s violation of a 
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term of supervised release on August 15, 2017.4  The 
Guidelines range for Schonewolf’s sentence was 24 to 30 
months’ imprisonment.  The Government advocated for an 
upward variance to 48 months, justifying this request by the 
fact that Schonewolf had previously benefitted from a lesser 
sentence because she had promised to stop using drugs.  The 
Government also relied on the Guidelines, pointing out that 
under Guideline § 7B1.4, application note 4, the Court was 
empowered to depart upward because Schonewolf had 
                                                          
4 While the Government argues that § 3583(g) is the operative 
framework here because Schonewolf’s violation involved a 
finding that she possessed a controlled substance, the record 
indicates otherwise.  Indeed, the District Court’s order 
revoking Schonewolf’s supervised release states specifically 
that the revocation is ordered “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3).”  JA3.  In any event, even if the Government were 
correct and § 3583(g) was the vehicle through which 
Schonewolf’s supervised release was revoked, this is a 
distinction without a difference as both require the same 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors in determining the 
sentence to impose.   
 
Discretionary revocation under § 3583(e) requires district 
courts to consider the factors present in § 3553(a) in crafting a 
sentence.  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Mandatory revocation under § 3583(g) “does not 
expressly require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors,” but 
similarly “does not prohibit the sentencing court from doing 
so.”  Id.  However, in United States v. Thornhill, we held that 
the § 3553(a) factors must be considered in imposing a 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).  759 F.3d 299, 309 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
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received a downward departure in 2012.  Schonewolf 
requested a 24-month sentence, based on, among other factors: 
(1) her long history of struggles with bipolar disorder and 
substance abuse; (2) the fact that her sales were solely to 
finance her own habit and did not involve violence; and (3) her 
existing two to four year state sentence, which she asserted 
would give her time to complete drug treatment. 
 
The District Court ultimately sentenced Schonewolf to 
40 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to her state 
sentence.  This was 10 months above the top of the Guidelines 
range.  To justify this sentence, the District Court said: 
 
“I mean, we—you were granted a 
significant downward departure [at] sentencing.  
You were granted a significant mercy at the time 
of your first violation and nonetheless, I mean, 
your behavior has just grown more and more 
severe, worse. 
 
And I—you know, I have reached a 
conclusion that you are a significant danger to 
yourself, you’re a significant danger to those 
who have lived with you, and you’re a significant 
danger to society.  And the last step we have in 
order to give you a fighting chance to recover 
from whatever addictions you have is to—is to 
limit your contact with the outside world for a 
significant period of time. 
 
As I said we had had great hope for you.  
I am thoroughly convinced that [the] United 
States has done—has gone way out in order to do 
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what it could to help you for a significant period 
of time, but that hasn’t worked.  Now, I have 
decided to grant an upward variance.  And the 
basis for the upward variance is Section 7B 1.4.  
And we take special note of Application Note 
number 4 which points out essentially what the 
government has pointed out as a basis for an 
upward variance from the range here.”5 
 
Schonewolf now appeals her sentence.6 
 
III. Standard of Review 
 
On appeal, Schonewolf argues that the District Court 
violated the Act by sentencing her to a term of imprisonment 
to promote her rehabilitation.  She did not raise this argument 
as an objection at her sentencing, and thus it is not preserved 
for appeal.7  We review unpreserved claims for plain error.8  To 
                                                          
5 Transcript of Violation of Supervised Release Hearing as to 
Janet Sonja Schonewolf held on Aug. 15, 2017 at 21, United 
States v. Schonewolf, No. 2:13-cr-00037-JP-1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
22, 2017), ECF No. 27. 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
7 United States v. Miller, 833 F.3d 274, 283 (3d Cir. 2016) (“A 
party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court—
when the court ruling or order is made or sought—of the action 
the party wishes the court to take, or the party’s objection to 
the court’s action and the grounds for that objection.” (quoting 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b))). 
8 United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). 
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be entitled to relief under a plain error standard, “a defendant 
must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that 
affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”9  When those three 
prongs are met, this Court may exercise its discretion to grant 
relief, but only if “the error seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”10  
 
IV. Schonewolf’s Sentencing Reform Act Claim 
 
In 1984, Congress passed the Act as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act.11  In the Act, Congress 
admonishes courts to, in considering the length of a prison 
sentence, “consider the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that 
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting 
correction and rehabilitation.”12  The Supreme Court 
interpreted this section of the Act in Tapia v. United States, and 
concluded that “§ 3582(a) tells courts that they should 
acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose 
of promoting rehabilitation.”13  The Court thus held that “the 
Sentencing Reform Act precludes federal courts from 
                                                          
9 Id. (quoting United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d 
Cir. 2008)); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
466–67 (1997) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
732 (1993)). 
10 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 (quotations omitted). 
11 United States v. Gozlon-Peretz, 894 F.2d 1402, 1403 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
12 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphasis added). 
13 564 U.S. at 327. 
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imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a 
criminal defendant’s rehabilitation.”14 
 
Prior to Tapia, this Court decided United States v. Doe, 
where we held that it did not violate the Act to “set[] the 
duration of [a defendant’s] post-revocation incarceration 
based, in part, on his need for drug rehabilitation.”15  In so 
doing, we explained that “the plain language and operation of 
the statute governing post-revocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3583(e) and (g), permits a district court to consider medical and 
rehabilitative needs in imposing a term of post-revocation 
imprisonment[.]”16   
 
Thus, there appears to be a facial distinction between 
Tapia, decided in the context of a post-conviction sentence, 
and this case, where Schonewolf’s sentence was imposed post-
violation, the same procedural posture present in Doe.  This 
presents the question of whether Tapia effectively overruled 
Doe and applies even in cases where a sentence is imposed 
post-violation under § 3583.17 
                                                          
14 Id. at 321. 
15 617 F.3d at 774. 
16 Id. at 770. 
17 The parties agree that Tapia has abrogated the rule in Doe.  
Nevertheless, because the legality of the District Court’s 
consideration of rehabilitation in crafting Schonewolf’s 
sentence is “properly before the court,” we are not bound by 
“the particular legal theories advanced by the parties,” but may 
“identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.” 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991).  Thus, 
we now consider the relationship between Tapia and Doe to 
determine which governs. 
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A. Interplay of Tapia and Doe 
 
Even before Tapia, this Circuit did not permit post-
conviction sentences to be tailored to rehabilitation.  In United 
States v. Manzella, we held that “[i]t is the policy of the United 
States Congress, clearly expressed in law, that defendants not 
be sent to prison or held there for a specific length of time for 
the sole purpose of rehabilitation.”18  Our review of the record 
convinced us that “the circumstances of the sentencing hearing 
clearly indicate that the District Court sentenced [defendant] to 
a prison term of 30 months for rehabilitative purposes” because 
the sentence was designed to give sufficient time for the 
defendant to complete the Bureau of Prison’s 500-hour drug 
treatment program.19  Thus, we concluded that the District 
Court erred in violating § 3582(a).20  
 
After Manzella, we decided Doe.  As mentioned, Doe 
held that it did not violate the Act to set a post-revocation 
sentence based, in part, on a defendant’s need for 
rehabilitation.21  We reconciled this with the rule in Manzella 
by noting “certain pivotal distinctions between the statutes 
governing post-conviction sentencing and those governing 
post-revocation sentencing.”22  Specifically, post-conviction 
imprisonment is limited by both §§ 3553(a)(2)(D) and 
3582(a).23  The former provides that the District Court should 
                                                          
18 475 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 2007). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 153, 161. 
21 Doe, 617 F.3d at 770. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
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consider “the need . . . to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”24  The 
latter adds the requirement that a sentence to a term of 
imprisonment must be crafted “recognizing that imprisonment 
is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 
rehabilitation.”25  Read together, post-conviction sentences 
must be crafted to consider a need for medical care and 
correctional treatment, while recognizing that rehabilitation is 
not a justification for a prison sentence.26  By contrast, we said 
that post-revocation sentences under § 3583 (e) and (g) were 
not subject to § 3582(a).27  Absent this requirement, we held 
that a District Court may consider rehabilitation in crafting a 
post-revocation prison sentence.28  
 
Then came Tapia.  In Tapia, the Supreme Court firmly 
held that “[s]ection 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from 
imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s 
rehabilitation.”29  The Court articulated multiple reasons for 
this.  It first noted the plain text of § 3582(a) provides “clarity” 
as to the operative rule.30  “Under standard rules of grammar, 
§ 3582(a) says: A sentencing judge shall recognize that 
imprisonment is not appropriate to promote rehabilitation . . .  
                                                          
24 Id. (quoting § 3553(a)(2)(D)). 
25 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
26 See Doe, 617 F.3d at 770–71.   
27 Id. at 771.  Consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
was allowed, but not required until Thornhill was decided 
four years later.  See supra note 4.     
28 Doe, 617 F.3d at 774. 
29 564 U.S. at 332. 
30 Id. at 326. 
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when determining both whether to imprison an offender and 
what length of term to give him.”31  Second, the Court found 
the “statutory silence” as to any provisions giving courts the 
authority to ensure defendants do participate in rehabilitative 
programs “[e]qually illuminating.”32  This is because, where 
Congress intended rehabilitation to be an aim of the sentence—
i.e. probation or supervised release—it gave courts the 
authority to order a defendant’s participation in rehabilitative 
programs.33  When it comes to prison sentences, however, 
“courts do not have this authority.”34  This “indicates that 
Congress did not intend that courts consider offenders’ 
rehabilitative needs when imposing prison sentences.”35 
 
Finally, legislative history confirms Congress’ intent 
that rehabilitation not be considered in sentencing a defendant 
to prison.36  The Senate Report regarding the Act noted that 
“almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now 
doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison 
setting.”37  It is for this reason, the Report states, that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(a) “specifies, in light of current knowledge, that the 
judge should recognize . . . that imprisonment is not an 
appropriate means of promoting correction and 
rehabilitation.”38 
 
                                                          
31 Id. at 328 (emphasis in original). 
32 Id. at 330. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 331. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 331–32. 
37 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). 
38 Id., at 119 (internal quotations omitted). 
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This brings us to the issue at hand, whether Tapia has 
any import here, where Schonewolf was sentenced to a term of 
incarceration following the revocation of her supervised 
release.  We now join our sister circuits in holding that Tapia 
applies to post-revocation prison sentences.39  In doing so, we 
                                                          
39 United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(Souter, J.) (“We feel bound to conclude that rehabilitation 
concerns must be treated as out of place at a resentencing to 
prison, just as ordering commitment initially.”); United States 
v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Tapia applies 
upon revocation of supervised release, as well as at the time of 
initial sentencing.”); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 
198 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We thus hold that Tapia applies to the 
revocation context too.”); United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 
655, 657 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The Government concedes that 
Tapia applies to revocation sentences, and we agree.”); United 
States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t appears 
inescapable that Tapia applies to revocation sentencing under 
§ 3583(e)(3), just as it does to initial sentencing after 
conviction under § 3582(a).”); United States v. Taylor, 679 
F.3d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Tapia applies upon 
revocation of supervised release as well as at an initial 
sentencing.”); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 280 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that Tapia applies to imprisonment 
regardless of whether imprisonment is imposed at initial 
sentencing or on revocation.”); United States v. Mendiola, 696 
F.3d 1033, 1043 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t follows ineluctably (plainly) that § 3582(a) prohibits a 
court from relying on rehabilitation considerations any time it 
chooses to send someone to . . . prison, whether as part of an 
initial sentence (as in Tapia) or as part of a sentence issued after 
a probation revocation (as in our case).”); United States v. 
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recognize that Tapia effectively overruled our decision in 
Doe.40  Put succinctly, post-revocation sentences under § 3583 
(e) and (g) are subject to the requirements of § 3582(a) of the 
Act.  Our rationale for this is simple: the reasons the Court gave 
for its holding in Tapia apply with equal force to post-
revocation prison sentences.  
  
First, the plain text of § 3582(a) indicates that it should 
also apply to post-revocation prison sentences.  The statute 
refers only to the sentence of “imprisonment,” not the 
                                                          
Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2014) (“This court 
has not decided whether Tapia applies in the context of 
resentencing upon the revocation of supervised release.  But 
we agree with our sister circuits and today hold that it does.”). 
40 While Doe, as a published decision of a prior panel of this 
Court, would normally be beyond our authority to overrule, see 
3d Cir. Internal Operating P. 9.1, in light of intervening 
Supreme Court case law, we may reevaluate our precedent.  
United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 126 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 
1996)).  Nor are we alone in being the only circuit to recognize 
that Tapia has effectively overruled prior circuit-level 
precedent permitting the consideration of rehabilitation in 
crafting a post-revocation prison sentence.  See Mendiola, 696 
F.3d at 1042 (“Consequently, we conclude that Tapia has 
effectively invalidated the majority’s decision in Tsosie.”); 
Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1309 (“[W]e recognize that Tapia 
abrogates our holding in United States v. Brown, where we 
stated that ‘a court may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative 
needs when imposing a specific incarcerative term following 
revocation of supervised release.’” (citation omitted)). 
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procedural posture by which such a sentence is imposed.41  
Intuitively this makes sense.  If a sentence of incarceration in 
prison is “not an appropriate means of promoting correction 
and rehabilitation,” why should it matter whether a defendant 
finds herself there immediately following her conviction or 
after the revocation of a term of supervised release?42  The 
obvious answer is it does not.  The realities of her 
confinement—and its hostility towards her rehabilitation—are 
identical. 
 
Second, Congress has not authorized courts to require 
participation in rehabilitative programs in prison.  Once 
sentenced to a prison term, courts lack any control over what, 
if any, treatment programs a defendant may participate in—
“decisionmaking authority rests with the [Bureau of 
Prisons].”43  This is true whether the defendant is sentenced 
post-conviction or post-revocation.44 
 
Extending Tapia to include post-revocation sentences is 
also consistent with the Congressional intent of § 3582(a).  
“[D]ecades of experience with indeterminate sentencing, 
resulting in the release of many inmates after they completed 
correction programs, had left Congress skeptical that 
‘rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting.’”45  
Once again, this prison setting is identical whether a defendant 
is sentenced to a term of imprisonment following her 
                                                          
41 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
42 See id. 
43 Tapia, 564 U.S. at 331.   
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). 
45 Tapia, 564 U.S. at 331-32 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 
23). 
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conviction or post-revocation.  Thus, Congress’ rationale 
applies with equal force to post-revocation prison sentences as 
it does to post-conviction prison sentences. 
 
B. Standard of Review for Potential Violations of Tapia 
 
Having determined that Tapia does apply to prison 
sentences imposed post-revocation, we must now consider the 
standard to be applied in considering whether a post-revocation 
sentence violates Tapia by impermissibly contemplating 
rehabilitation.  While there is apparent unanimity as to Tapia’s 
application to post-revocation sentences, a circuit split has 
emerged regarding the standard to be applied in considering 
whether there has been a Tapia violation.  
  
On one hand, the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits impose a stringent standard by which seemingly any 
consideration of rehabilitation is impermissible under Tapia.46  
                                                          
46 United States v. Spann, 757 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“[I]n basing [defendant’s] sentence even in part on that 
consideration [learning lawful job skills] [the District Court] 
was violating the rule of Tapia . . . .” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 1281 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(dictum) (“The district court’s Statement of Reasons seems to 
reflect that rehabilitation may have been a factor in the court’s 
sentencing decision.” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying a 
rule where Tapia is violated if rehabilitation is one of many 
considered factors because “[a] rule requiring reversal only 
when rehabilitation is the sole motivation would not make 
sense” because “there will almost always be some valid 
reasons advanced by the district court for imposing the 
 18 
 
In the view of these courts, Tapia is violated wherever 
rehabilitation is given any weight in the decision to impose or 
lengthen a prison sentence.47  This, however, seems to leave 
open the possibility that a District Court may make reference 
to rehabilitation and still satisfy Tapia in certain circumstances 
where it is clear that the discussion of rehabilitation carried 
zero weight, i.e., the sentence was not based, even in de 
minimis part, on a desire to foster rehabilitation.   
 
On the other hand, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have articulated a narrower 
standard, requiring that rehabilitation must have been the 
determining factor in a prison sentence before finding a Tapia 
violation.48  Under this standard, rehabilitation may be a factor 
                                                          
sentence issued”); Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1310 [11th Cir.] 
(“[W]e hold that Tapia error occurs where the district court 
considers rehabilitation when crafting a sentence of 
imprisonment.”).  
47 See, e.g., Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1310 (Tapia error occurs 
in considering rehabilitation as one of many factors in selecting 
a prison sentence); Thornton, 846 F.3d at 1116 (same). 
48 See United States v. Del Valle-Rodrigues, 761 F.3d 171, 174 
(1st Cir. 2014) (“In the absence of a causal relationship, courts 
have hesitated to find Tapia error.  Where, however, the record 
indicates that rehabilitative concerns were the driving force 
behind, or a dominant factor in, the length of a sentence, courts 
have found Tapia error.”); Lifshitz, 714 F.3d at 150 [2d Cir.] 
(“The sentencing colloquy demonstrates that the district 
court’s primary considerations in sentencing [defendant] were 
‘promoting respect for the law and protecting the public from 
further crimes of this defendant.’  While the district court also 
considered [defendant’s] need for medical care, there is no 
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granted some weight in selecting a prison sentence, so long as 
it is not the primary or dominant consideration.49 
 
On appeal, Schonewolf argues that the former standard 
should apply.  Alternatively, she asserts that the standard does 
not matter because under either standard the District Court 
                                                          
indication in the record that the district court based the length 
of [defendant’s] sentence on his need for treatment.” (emphasis 
added)); Bennett, 698 F.3d at 201 [4th Cir.] (refusing to find 
error under Tapia where “[defendant’s] rehabilitative needs 
clearly constituted only a minor fragment of the court’s 
reasoning.” (emphasis added)); Garza, 706 F.3d at 660 [5th 
Cir.] (“Our limited precedent post-Tapia has described the 
distinction between legitimate commentary and inappropriate 
consideration as whether rehabilitation is a ‘secondary 
concern’ or ‘additional justification’ (permissible) as opposed 
to a ‘dominant factor’ (impermissible) informing the district 
court’s decision.”); Deen, 706 F.3d at 768 [6th Cir.] (“Trouble 
[under Tapia] only comes when a court imposes or lengthens a 
sentence ‘to enable an offender to complete a treatment 
program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation’ inside a 
prison’s walls.”) (quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at 335); United 
States v. Replogle, 678 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We are 
not convinced that the court’s fleeting reference to whether 
[defendant] might be ‘treated better somewhere else’ 
demonstrates an obvious violation of § 3582(a) and the holding 
of Tapia.”). 
49 See, e.g., Lifshitz, 714 F.3d at 150 (finding no Tapia error 
where rehabilitation was not a primary factor in sentence 
selection); Garza, 706 F.3d at 660 (finding no Tapia error 
where rehabilitation was not the dominant factor in sentence 
selection). 
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erred.  We think the second, narrower standard ought apply to 
post-revocation sentences, just as we have applied it to post-
conviction sentences.50  It is our view that this approach tracks 
Tapia more closely. 
    
In reversing the judgment affirming the sentence in 
Tapia, the Supreme Court determined that the District Court 
erred in “indicat[ing] that [Defendant] should serve a prison 
term long enough to qualify for and complete [the Bureau of 
Prison’s Residential Drug Abuse Program].”51  This is the 
paradigmatic example of how a District Court’s sentence may 
violate the Act—when it is imposed or lengthened to provide 
the opportunity to further a rehabilitative aim.  Importantly, the 
opinion specifically left open the door for a District Court to 
“discuss[] the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or 
the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.”52 
 
Thus, we think the better reading of Tapia would only 
find error where the record suggests “that the court may have 
calculated the length of [a defendant’s] sentence to ensure that 
she receive[s] certain rehabilitative services.”53  We have 
already held that Tapia cautions that “courts cannot impose or 
lengthen a prison term merely to promote an offender’s 
                                                          
50 See United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 392 (3d Cir. 
2013) (declining to find Tapia violation where statements 
regarding rehabilitation did “not show that the District Court 
imposed a longer sentence to ensure that [defendant] received 
the treatment that he needed”). 
51 Tapia, 564 U.S. at 321–22 
52 Id. at 334. 
53 Id. at 334–35. 
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rehabilitation.”54  “This assuredly does not mean, however, that 
judges are prohibited from mentioning rehabilitation during the 
sentencing hearing.”55  A lower threshold would run afoul 
Tapia and risk a chilling effect on district courts “discussing 
the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison,” a subject 
that “a court properly may address.”56  
 
C. Application to Schonewolf 
 
With the proper framework in mind, we must now 
consider whether the District Court impermissibly imposed or 
lengthened Schonewolf’s sentence for rehabilitative ends in 
violation of the Act and Tapia.  Schonewolf points to numerous 
statements made by the District Court that she alleges evidence 
that it impermissibly relied on rehabilitation in crafting its 
sentence.  She asserts the District Court’s comments were 
addiction-centric and “framed the choice [of sentence] in terms 
of treating her addiction.”57  Moreover, Schonewolf cites 
numerous examples of the District Court expressing concern 
for Schonewolf’s behavior being harmful to herself.58  
                                                          
54 Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 391 (emphasis added); see also Del 
Valle-Rodrigues, 761 F.3d at 175 (rehabilitation must be 
“dominant factor” for Tapia violation to be found); Garza, 706 
F.3d at 660 (same); Lifshitz, 714 F.3d at 150 (finding no Tapia 
violation where rehabilitation was not a “primary 
consideration[]” in sentence);  
55 Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 391. 
56 Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334. 
57 Appellant Br. at 22. 
58 Specifically, Schonewolf cites the following: (1) in soliciting 
comments at sentencing from the Probation Office, the District 
Court asked “What’s the best for [Schonewolf] under these 
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Schonewolf draws particular attention to the District Court’s 
comment that “the last step we have in order to give you a 
fighting chance to recover from whatever addictions that you 
have is to – is to limit your contact with the outside world for 
a significant period of time.”59  She argues this is evidence that 
the District Court was sentencing her in an effort to aid in her 
rehabilitation from drug addiction. 
 
Despite Schonewolf’s arguments to the contrary, our 
review of the record finds no Tapia error in the District Court’s 
sentence.  In viewing the record as a whole, it is clear that the 
District Court’s decision to impose a prison sentence, and what 
length of sentence to impose, were made independently of any 
discussion of Schonewolf’s drug addiction and the potential for 
sobriety.  Schonewolf’s sentence was not based on 
rehabilitation but, instead, on past lenity.  On this, the District 
Court was explicit: “I have decided to grant an upward 
variance.  And the basis for the upward variance is Section 7B 
1.4.  And we take special note of Application Note number 4 
which points out essentially what the government has pointed 
out as a basis for an upward variance from the range here.”60  
                                                          
circumstances?,” Appellant Br. at 22; (2) the District Court 
opined that Schonewolf needed “to be contained not only for 
the benefit of society, but . . . for her own benefit,” id., and that 
“not only is she a danger to society, she’s also a significant 
danger to herself,” id.; (3) in addressing Schonewolf, the 
District Court told her “I have reached a conclusion that you 
are a significant danger to yourself, you’re a significant danger 
to those who have lived with you, and you’re a significant 
danger to society,” id. 
59 Id. at 22–23. 
60 Appellant Br. at 10. 
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This is a reference to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 
7B1.4, application note 4, which provides that “[w]here the 
original sentence was the result of a downward departure . . . 
an upward departure may be warranted.”61 
   
Moreover, while Schonewolf is certainly correct that 
the District Court did make numerous references to her drug 
addiction and its hope that she discontinue her drug use, she is 
mistaken that this is error.  Tapia itself is illustrative.  There, 
the Court found error because the District Court clearly tailored 
the length of its sentence to allow the defendant to be in prison 
for a sufficient amount of time to complete a specific drug 
rehabilitation program.62  Indeed, the District Court said as 
much, stating that one factor in the 51-month sentence was “so 
she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program.”63  
  
In contrast, in Zabielski, this Court declined to find a 
sentence violated Tapia where the District Court said “one 
reason why I think that incarceration at this point in time is 
necessary is the fact that you don’t seem to be able to live up 
to the conditions that you need to maintain in order to keep 
yourself sober and on your medications.”64  This does not 
violate Tapia because—while it assuredly discusses 
rehabilitation—“it does not show that the District Court 
imposed a longer sentence to ensure that [the defendant] 
received the treatment that he needed.”65  Similarly, there is no 
                                                          
61 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, cmt. n.4 (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2016). 
62 Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334–35.   
63 Id. at 322. 
64 722 F.3d at 391. 
65 Id. 
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indication that the District Court specifically tailored its 
sentence length to any particular rehabilitation program, nor 
that it imposed a longer sentence to ensure Schonewolf 
received drug treatment.  
  
Accordingly, we hold that Schonewolf’s sentence did 
not violate the Sentencing Reform Act or Tapia.  Given that 
Schonewolf’s sentence was not legally erroneous, she cannot 
meet her burden of establishing plain error. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
